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Abstract: International trade has been tested by a growing number of economic, political, ideological, institutional 
and legal challenges. On the one hand, the future of the global trading system depends largely upon the 
development of all these ‘external’, uncertain and unpredictable risks and opportunities of various natures. On the 
other hand, international trade and the functioning of the global trading system is one of the major factors that 
have a significant impact upon the shaping of the present and future world order.
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Trade has always been the generating force of economic growth, employment, prosperity 
and progress of humanity. The forms, the objects, the technics and the rules have always 
been changing throughout history. These transformations are rapidly accelerating but the 
substance and function of exchanging the products of human activities on a local, regional 
and global level have remained essentially the same – creating wealth and promoting 
welfare. What used to be limited to the exchange and physical movement of goods has been 
extended to services of all kinds and now more and more engulfs the flow of data.
The fundamental shift in the relation between the trade in goods, the trade in services 
and the flow of data, due to the breath-taking development of technology – the new 
phenomenon of ‘deep-tech’ and all that it entails, create the impression that trade is losing 
its importance and the main transformation is taking shape outside the traditional sense 
of trade. However, deep-tech does not diminish the role of trade in the widest sense, 
i.e. exchanging everything that is created physically or intellectually by humans, including 
algorithms for robotization, automation or ultimately artificial intelligence.
It is true that the volume of goods moved around the world, in particular the goods 
carried by sea, is not increasing but is on the wane, in relative to trade in services and also 
the global economic growth. At the same time, supply chains become even more complex, 
increasingly relying on new technologies, substituting data for components. All in all, the 
ancient devise ‘navigare necesse est’ is still valid and in a more abstract sense, it is more 
relevant than ever.
The deep-rooted and sweeping transformation in the nature, structure and forms of 
international trade has resulted in both macroeconomic theory and political doctrine 
becoming fundamentally divided on a long range of issues, previously considered as simple 
evidences based on conventional wisdom. 
Are bilateral trade balances still (or again) relevant or in a multilateral world economic 
system bilateral imbalances may be considered irrelevant? What are the main causes of 
perennial bilateral deficits? Are there general macroeconomic reasons behind these 
imbalances, such as excessive spending and saving on the other side? Or it is the 
‘manipulated’ value of some countries’ currency, or the unfair rules established by 
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multilateral or by regional agreements or, indeed, their persistent violations that are to be 
primarily blamed for all these disequilibria and controversies. 
Conflicting economic theories, diverse and opposing ideas and arguments are swirling 
around in academic, as well as, in public discourse and make – directly and immediately – 
their way to heated political debates. Correlation is confused with causation and vice versa. 
Political ideologies step in and make a once scholarly and intellectually attractive, but 
in broader political debates somewhat neglected, subject the area of fiercest debates – 
a battlefield of ideological and political clashes. TTIP, TPP, NAFTA are only some of the 
cases in point. The war is therefore economic, political and cultural alike and the conflicts 
between national interests are compounded by deep ideological divides that are made 
instrumentals by political movements for their own political purposes. The conflict between 
the regulatory autonomy or sovereignty of states and the beyond the border regulatory 
efforts of the new generation free trade agreements also reflects in the most spectacular 
manner the deepening ideological divide which is ultimately rooted in the diametrically 
opposing views relating to the tackling of globalization and the visions on global 
governance. 
The internal conflicts and challenges of the world trading system are aggravated by the 
geopolitical challenges, tectonic shifts and rumbles from all around the world. The ‘great 
shift’ in the economic and geopolitical power structure of the world, the absence of a single 
dominant power or hegemon, the growing fragmentation of the economic, geopolitical and 
cultural world order, the rise of a multi-actor, multi stake-holder world, the re-emerging 
spheres of influence, the growing antagonisms and all the risks and threats entailed by them 
supply the basic framework and background for an international trading system fighting for 
its survival and for the saving of its tremendous achievements of the last 70 years.
The role of legal scholarship in this situation, characterized also by excessive rhetoric, 
should initially be, to calm down the excitement, ‘calmer les esprits’ and to take an 
objective, reasonable and balanced approach, distancing itself from ideological motives and 
sentiments.1 Thorough analysis must be conducted at the same time, based upon reliable 
research and data in order to lay down the groundwork for future rule-making on local, 
national, regional and global level.
The global trading system, as established and developed by international trade law, 
stands on two interconnected pillars: International – multilateral and regional (bilateral) – 
rule making and the adjudication of disputes on the basis of all these regulatory instruments.
It is well known that the multilateral trade regulations came to a standstill around 
20 years ago and since then, they seems to be in a frozen state. Minor achievements have 
been made, such as the Trade Facilitation Agreement (Bali, 2013) or the Information 
Technology Agreement (extended in Nairobi, 201 this being the first major tariff cutting 
deal on an MFN basis since 1996), but most of the original aspirations of the Doha Round 
simply have failed and are not to be expected to materialize even at a longer term.
The substantial increase in the number of participants in the global game, the changes 
in their economic weight and political clout and the absence of timely adaptation to them 
certainly has contributed to the deadlock in the multilateral rule-making. Another reason is 
the over-stretching of the scope or coverage of the regulations. The existing structure could 
no longer carry the multiplied weight of more and more targeted areas of law-making. On a 
more general level and in a deeper context, the freezing of the multilateral regulatory 
1 Martonyi (2016).
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process also reflects the overall gridlock in the functioning of the global institutions or 
global governance.
The realistic objective that can now be set for the future development of the multilateral 
regulation of world trade is, first and foremost, the preserving and maintaining of the 
present system with all the substantial achievements. At the same time, the ‘global acquis’ 
of the regulatory system should and can be improved, developed and aligned with new 
demands and realities in some specific, limited areas. This has been the case in recent years. 
‘Save what we have’, ‘maintain it in workable shape’ and ‘keep the power dry’ for the 
future can be the basic aspirations for the multilateral (global) rule-making in the present 
situation. Developments on other levels of regulation will further unfold, and are in many 
fields equally or even more suited to tackle the issues of international trade which itself, as 
has been seen, happens to be in deep and accelerating transformation. It is not only trade in 
the widest and more abstract sense that is rapidly changing, but also the social, political and 
economic demands and expectations are intensifying and have an even stronger impact 
upon all kinds of rule-making.
The multilateral trade regulation seems to have reached its limits which also appear to 
be in line with the apparent, structural or conjectural?, slowing down of globalization whilst 
the other pillar of the world trading system is still in fairly good shape and functions 
satisfactorily. The dispute settlement system of the WTO is often referred to as the ‘bright 
spot’ of the international trading system2 handling a growing number of complex and 
serious disputes between various members of WTO with a very high ratio (90%) of 
compliance. The freezing of the rule-making branch of the system and the unfulfilled needs 
for adjustment and development of the rules has obliged the dispute resolution mechanism, 
in a way, to take over some of the tasks of the regulation and has to resolve issues that 
should normally be tackled by the organic development of the legislative process. The DSS 
of the WTO has therefore become the ‘victim of its own success’ and is being flooded by 
disputes in growing number and complexity. The system is more and more overloaded. 
Non-trade issues are on the rise, panels and the Appellate Body are confronted with the 
need to balance between disgeneric values which make their task sometimes close to 
impossible. At the same time, it is mistaken to believe that the DSS, that is the judicial 
function, can take over not only part of the legislative function, but also the ‘whole pain of 
the world’ from environment protection to labour law, from SPS to social welfare or from 
data protection to human rights. The result is the increasing length of the procedures and 
also the decrease in prompt compliance.3
The multilateral DSS remains to be the most successful area of the world trading 
system despite these and other challenges. It is not perfect, but is fair and efficient. This is 
the reason why the multilateral dispute settlement seems to be winning the ‘competition’ 
with the dispute settlement mechanisms of the regional trade agreements. There is an 
ongoing academic discussion on the relationship and the possible jurisdictional conflict 
between the two mechanisms but the ‘vast majority of RTA – DSMs have not been used 
at all’, and even the ‘FTA partners continue to use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
to resolve disputes between them’.4 One of the reasons for this preference for the 
WTO mechanism is no doubt its more legalistic character both in a substantive and in a 
2 According to Sacerdoti ‘the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the WTO continues to be 
considered a success story, and rightly so’. Sacerdoti (2016) 46.
3 Sacerdoti (2016) 47–49.
4 Chase et al (2016) 610.
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procedural sense. The level of commitments, of course, differs as RTAs essentially aim to 
establish free trade with rights and obligations going well beyond the multilateral 
framework. The RTA – DSMs represent a wide range of models, from the pure political-
diplomatic consultation to quasi-juridical and juridical systems or even a supranational 
model with direct effect of the decision adjudicating the dispute.5
The bright spot of the international trading system is, however, exposed not only to 
legal or procedural risks, but also to threats of general and fundamental nature. The dark 
clouds seem to be assembling on the horizon of the multilateral trading system. The general 
political and economic background also have a negative impact upon the judicial function. 
If this function is severely damaged, the overall system might receive a mortal blow. This is 
why all efforts must be developed in order to improve the dispute settlement system itself, 
adapting it to the new challenges, as well as to the political and economic realities.
Procedural improvements of the dispute settlement mechanism are needed and would, 
undoubtedly, be helpful. Whatever all these corrections will be, it must be clear, however, 
that the judicial function cannot, by itself save and secure the future of the multilateral 
trading system. The dispute settlement mechanism will be unable to appropriately fulfil its 
function without a solid legislative background, a basis of non-frozen rules, but evolve, 
adapt and develop according to the changes of the economic and political environment. The 
legislative and judicial function cannot be separated and are ultimately not only interlinked 
but also interdependent – one cannot live without the other. The ambitions for the revival of 
the rulemaking are still there and in the light of several statements it seems this time again, 
that hope is the last thing to die. 
It cannot be contested that one of the main reasons for the rapid growth of RTAs has 
been the deadlock in the multilateral rule-making of WTO. At the same time, the 
differentiation of the multilateral system started well before the slowdown or the standstill 
in multilateral rule-making. It started with the birth of the system by including Article 
XXIV in the GATT, 1947. Exceptions from and derogations to the principle of equal 
treatment as implemented by MFN treatment widened both in law and in practice. WTO 
was established what used to be the general rule with limited exceptions became in reality 
the exception.6
This tendency was substantially accelerated by the special bilateral or regional 
(plurilateral) agreements based upon Article XXIV of GATT, Article V of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS) or paragraph 2c of the Enabling Clause. The 
cornerstone of the multilateral system was the fundamental principle of equal treatment and 
the objective was to achieve progressive multilateral liberalisation, not to establish free 
trade – the purpose of the RTAs’ was precisely the opposite. The objective here has been to 
establish special regimes, in most cases free trade between the parties. These agreements 
are by nature discriminatory granting special rights and benefits for their parties and by the 
same token, depriving the non-parties of the same rights and benefits.
By the end of 2016, there were 271 RTAs in force and notified to the WTO under the 
Transparency Mechanism of RTAs.7 In case agreements for goods and for services are 
counted separately the number of RTAs in force and notified was 461, while the overall 
number concluded and notified was 629. An unknown number of RTSs has not been notified 
5 Chase et al (2016) 618–21.
6 Martonyi (2015).
7 Recent Developments in Regional Trade Agreements, INT/SUB/RTA/153, July–December 
2016.
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and therefore does not appear in the WTO Transparency Mechanism. 20% of all RTAs in 
force are European, 17% are in East Asia, 12% in South-America and 9% in the CIS region. 
The European Union has by far the highest number of RTAs. This number is in line with the 
EU’s growing global outreach and will be further increasing. The United States (20) and 
China (14) follow the EU from a significant distance. The difference between the US and 
the Chinese number will soon be reduced and probably reversed due to the US step back 
from TPP (and perhaps other decisions to follow) and also as a result of the Chinese 
expansion, not only by filling the Asian vacuum created by the US, but also as part of a 
global geopolitical and economic ambition. The new bilateral or ‘transactional’ approach 
taken by the US and a more active Chinese trade policy driven by a growing assertiveness 
and a global vision and aspiration might reverse not only the relationship between the 
number of RTAs, but also affect the geopolitical and economic power balance between the 
two superpowers. Conclusions, however, should not be hastily drawn, given the complexity 
of the various factors and the uncertainty of developments. One, often somewhat 
disregarded, factor is the overwhelming advantage of the United States in the field of ‘soft 
power’.
The RTAs growth has not been limited to their number but extended also their coverage 
as their scope has become more and more comprehensive, including provisions on 
intellectual property, competition, government procurement, investment and also regulation 
on the protection of human and animal health, environment, labour, social welfare and 
human rights. The overstretching of RTA coverage means that RTAs’ world has been 
encountered by very similar challenges to those previously met by the multilateral 
regulation. The consequences of the extension of the regulated areas are, however, very 
much different in the multilateral rule-making and in the RTAs. RTAs are essentially free 
trade agreements, their regulations go much further ‘beyond the border’ and interfere much 
deeper with the national regulatory autonomy of the parties. This is where the serious 
political conflicts enter and turn into ideological clashes between the two sides of the 
deepening divide, increasingly instrumentalized for political purposes. This is the ideal 
terrain where ‘globalists’ and ‘sovereigntists’ can display and advocate their emotionally 
laden ideological and political prejudices, This can jeopardize the efforts aiming at the 
promotion of more free, more fair and more rule-based trade – rules that also have the basic 
function to protect and to safeguard the interests of the smaller and the weaker. 
One way of easing the tension created by conflicting world visions could be to exercise 
more restraint in the widening of the scope of the agreements, the original function of which 
happened to be the promotion of free and fair trade. Political controversies are, in any case, 
hard to avoid, given not only the opposing ideological convictions, but also the underlying 
material, indeed, economic interests.8 It is also to be noted that quite frequently the same 
political and societal movements that demand respect for the regulatory sovereignty of 
nations strongly request the validation of social, labour and human rights for other countries, 
hence the inclusion of such provisions in the agreements.
Geographic proximity, economic policies, supply chains and geopolitics are the four 
drivers behind the establishment and shaping of RTAs and for at least a decade, the third 
and fourth factors have steadily been gaining importance. At the beginning of RTAs, it was 
clearly the geographic proximity was most visible factor – free trade areas or customs 
unions were essentially developed between or among neighbouring countries. Economic 
8 Nagy (2018) 203–205.
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and social philosophy determining the political, social order as well as the economic and 
trade policies of the potential partners of an RTA also used to play a decisive role, as free 
trade was (and still is) unimaginable without a certain level of market economy and, 
accordingly, WTO membership. RTAs have been progressively establishing free trade and 
increasingly have come into being between not only geographically remote countries, but 
also parties whose economic, social and political orders show significant discrepancies. 
ASEAN was the first, but not the last evident example for this, where the ‘ideological 
diversity’ is compounded by the huge differences in the level of economic development. 
(Laos and Singapore.) Now, new RTAs have been concluded or are being negotiated 
between parties separated both by geographic distance and political philosophy e.g., EU–
Vietnam, China and Chile or Switzerland.
Both the regional and the global economy are now based on supply chains that are 
now the major factors in the establishment of RTAs. On the other hand, RTAs themselves 
buoy up supply chains by stimulating and facilitating the free movement of goods and 
services becoming part of the supply as well as value chains. Hopefully be able to avoid the 
catastrophic consequences of a long-standing and well-functioning free trading regime, a 
single market, ceases to exist can be avoid thereby disrupting innumerable vital supply 
chains developed over several decades between the EU and the United Kingdom.9
In line with the general geopolitical developments, in particular the exacerbation of 
power struggles and confrontations of economic interests, the geopolitical factors also have 
a significant impact upon the establishment of RTAs. The best well-known example is the 
TPP where the original geopolitical objective of the United States was evident: The creation 
of an economic area, to develop closer ties with all the other 11 Asian, North and Latin-
American nations and exclusion of China, the great geopolitical rival. The withdrawal of 
the US will also have geopolitical consequences, precisely the opposite of what was the 
original intent. China will likely take the place of the US and that will not only shift most of 
the economic benefits to the Middle Empire but it will re-enforce the Chinese geopolitical 
position and power in and well beyond the Asian region. Whether the economic withdrawal 
can be off-set by increasing military capabilities and power is an open – and somewhat 
ominous – question.
There is an older and closer demonstration of the sometimes preponderant role of 
geopolitics in creating RTAs. It is the European integration process where the original 
purpose was preponderantly political. Only after the treaty on the European Defence 
Community was voted down by the French National Assembly in 1954 was the idea of 
progressively creating an economic integration and thereby laying down the economic basis 
for an ultimate political union of Europe (‘finalité politique’) was put on the table by 
ingenious ‘technocrats’ like Jean Monnet. In doing so, he also invented the great technique 
of the ‘méthode communautaire’ that has been the key driver of the organic and incremental 
development of the European construction for at least for half a century. It is another 
question that the ‘technocratic’ approach has now been exhausted, in part because of its 
excessive overreach creating thereby problems that it could not resolve. Again, a ‘victim 
of its own success’. Now it is high time to revert to the origins and to the somewhat 
forgotten principle of the ‘finalité politique’, adapted to the new situation in the world, 
primarily in the external relations of Europe. 
9 Martonyi (2016).
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Whatever are the key drivers of the RTAs, they show a very high level of diversity, not 
only because of the differing factors and purposes behind them, but also due to the very 
different historic, economic and political situations in which they come into being. They are 
diverse in their coverage, structure, legal techniques, substantive provisions, rights, 
obligations, dispute settlement mechanisms and hence are not easy to be classified in 
various groups or models. This reflects the growing differentiation of the overall trading 
system starting originally within the multilateral framework, and later continued and 
deepened by the spreading of all sorts of bilateral, regional, plurilateral free trade agreements 
(as well as customs unions). However, behind this overwhelming trend of differentiation 
and fragmentation, there are apparent commonalities, principles and general features that 
may represent the groundwork for a future re-unification of the international trade rules. 
It should not be forgotten that the historic and legal background for the establishment of 
GATT was the sophisticated network of bilateral trade agreements based upon the MFN 
treatment that was ingeniously multilateralized in the new situation after the Second World 
War.
All these developments taking place in the international trading system reflect and 
demonstrate the general economic and geopolitical trends. Globalization slows down but 
goes on, regionalization, localisation is on the rise, but is intertwined with universal and 
common elements.
Geopolitical power and responsibility progressively devolve to regional levels, the 
diffusion of power decentralizes governance and rule-making but global risks and 
opportunities demand common action and universal (multilateral) rule-making.
These two competing and, at the same time, complementary tendencies are present not 
only in geopolitics, in the global economy and in the international trading system, but also 
in what is called ‘soft power’ or, indeed, culture in the widest possible sense. Culture tends 
to be belittled as the ultimate mover of all the other areas as the majority of attention is 
focused upon the economic and geopolitical (including military might) parts of the equation. 
‘It is culture that matters’, culture essentially creates and forms economy, politics and all 
the other areas of human and social activities. 
Rule-making is part of culture and as such does not only reflect, but also develops and 
shapes geopolitics as well as the economy. If this is true, then it is possible not only describe 
and analyse what is going on and why, but there is the possibility, the capability and the 
responsibility – by local, national, regional and universal rule-making – to influence, to 
shape and to improve the world’s security, stability and prosperity.
Rules are getting more universal and fragmented at the same time, the world which 
was supposed to be flat is more and more divided, and power is more devolved. The 
economy and trade is inherently interdependent and multilateral but regional and bilateral 
endeavours increasingly pervade the whole system. Culture is diverse, collective identities 
differ (dialogue, not clash!), but it cannot dispense with some universal values that many 
believe, are of absolute nature. In this complex, tumultuous competition trade, free, fair and 
rule-based trade with a strong multilateral dimension has a vital role to play.
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